Friday, July 28, 2006
Ralph Peters Has Another Downer Column
The IDF's errors played into Hezbollah's hands. Initially relying on air power, the IDF ignored the basic military principles of surprise, mass and concentration of effort. Instead of aiming a shocking, concentrated blow at Hezbollah, the IDF dissipated its power by striking targets scattered throughout Lebanon - while failing to strike any of them decisively.
Even now, in the struggle for a handful of border villages, the IDF continues to commit its forces piecemeal - a lieutenant's mistake. Adding troops in increments allows the enemy to adjust to the increasing pressure - instead of being crushed by one mighty blow.
Given the nature of the inciting incident, surprise was not in the cards. Couldn't agree more that more men into the first waves of bunker clearing would have been good.
I wouldn't say that it's over. Things looked pretty bleak on December 20, 1944 in many parts of Belgium, we still crushed the Krauts.
True, except of course the "Krauts " were wearing rather striking uniforms and it was pretty easy to distinguish them from the Belgiums.
The element of surprise could have been used to Israel's advantage. Hezbollah leaders were actually quite surprised.
Your argument that ...
Given the nature of the inciting incident, surprise was not in the cards.
I think holds little water.
They could have hit Hezbollah headquarters before, say, Beirut international (the first target).