Wednesday, December 28, 2005
Justice DeLayed is Justice Denied
Tom DeLay is trying like heck to get the remaining, (probably) baseless indictment from partisan hack DA Ronnie Earle dismissed so DeLay can run next year for the leadership position he had to step down from this year. Earle is dragging his feet (adding credibility to idea that Earle really only wanted to get DeLay out of the House leadership). But DeLay is making progress, according to Kevin Aylward over at Wizbang. Here is a link to a PDF version of his motion to dismiss (actually Motions for Writs of Mandamus and Habeas Corpus). Here is a link to a PDF version of the original Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
To paraphrase regarding the conspiracy charge, DeLay's lawyer says that the Texas law, at the time of the alleged conspiracy, only applied conspiracy to offenses in the Texas Penal Code, unless the statute outside the Penal Code contained words that made conspiracy apply to that statute. Simply put, the Election Code is outside the Penal Code and did not contain the necessary application words at the time DeLay is alleged to have conspired (the Election Code now contains those words) so there simply was no such crime as conspiracy to violate the Election Code with which DeLay has been charged. Seems pretty straightforward. I'll take the lawyer's word about the lack of necessary application language in the Election Code, however, the limitation, regarding conspiracy, only to other crimes contained in the Penal Code doesn't jump off the page at me. This could be an Achilles heel to the motion. Or I might be having a dim period.
Regarding the money laundering charge, it seems to go better. DeLay is charged with laundering $190,000 in checks. DeLay's lawyer argues that money laundering requires, well, money. The action element of money laundering is to do something with funds. Again at the time of the alleged criminal misconduct, the definition of funds in the money laundering statute did not include checks. Now it does; but the change was too late to cover any action of DeLay and the recent change in the law to add checks to the definition of funds is very good evidence that checks were not part of the original definition. That part looks pretty airtight.
Can't wait to see Earle's response to these motions for writs.
The Houston Chronicle has a decidedly less helpful story on this.
To paraphrase regarding the conspiracy charge, DeLay's lawyer says that the Texas law, at the time of the alleged conspiracy, only applied conspiracy to offenses in the Texas Penal Code, unless the statute outside the Penal Code contained words that made conspiracy apply to that statute. Simply put, the Election Code is outside the Penal Code and did not contain the necessary application words at the time DeLay is alleged to have conspired (the Election Code now contains those words) so there simply was no such crime as conspiracy to violate the Election Code with which DeLay has been charged. Seems pretty straightforward. I'll take the lawyer's word about the lack of necessary application language in the Election Code, however, the limitation, regarding conspiracy, only to other crimes contained in the Penal Code doesn't jump off the page at me. This could be an Achilles heel to the motion. Or I might be having a dim period.
Regarding the money laundering charge, it seems to go better. DeLay is charged with laundering $190,000 in checks. DeLay's lawyer argues that money laundering requires, well, money. The action element of money laundering is to do something with funds. Again at the time of the alleged criminal misconduct, the definition of funds in the money laundering statute did not include checks. Now it does; but the change was too late to cover any action of DeLay and the recent change in the law to add checks to the definition of funds is very good evidence that checks were not part of the original definition. That part looks pretty airtight.
Can't wait to see Earle's response to these motions for writs.
The Houston Chronicle has a decidedly less helpful story on this.